Social scientists have debated the origins and goals of militant Islam for years. Some have adopted variations of Samuel Huntington’s argument that inter-cultural animosity is the result of an inevitable “clash of civilizations” in which ethnically homogenous blocs attempt to preserve their interests in the face of encroaching globalization.1 Others contend that the violence is purely a vengeful response to socio-political indignations caused by Western states.2 Yet, with an intricate and compelling thesis, Faisal Devji’s The Terrorist in Search of Humanity upends these conventional analyses of Islamic militantism. Through a dialectical examination of al-Qaeda and others’ proclamations, Devji contends that Muslim terrorists perversely mime Gandhi by acting out of a moral, non-ideological conviction that aims to create a post-humanist global politics.

The Terrorist in Search of Humanity takes it inspiration from the philosophy of Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, both of whom noted that the atomic age ushered in an era of global politics that, because of the destructive potential of the weapons in the context of the Cold War, introduced humanity as a single entity into the global conscious. Militant Islam, says Devji, envisions itself as a contemporary moral representative of a threatened humanity in which the ummah casts itself the “global victim.” This role is made possible by the extremists’ non-ideology. In opposition to those claiming militant Islam promotes a revolutionary political agenda, the author points out that Muslim extremists, unlike traditional agitators, have yet to detail the future political landscape for which they strive. In militant communiques, the aims are vague and emphasize the suprapolitical, in reference to the establishment of a moral global order.

The non-ideological character of Muslim extremists, however, is ineffective without the pluralism it affords. Devji finds this significant in two respects. First, pluralism refers to the globality of moralism. In other words, the pluralism of al-Qaeda and its spinoffs allows it to take up the banner of the disposed and downtrodden, regardless of their religious orientation. To support this argument, Devji cites multiple examples of fundamentalist Muslims championing Hindu causes and vice versa throughout the twentieth century and extremists’ adoption of environmentalism. Second, pluralism allows militant Islam to appeal to the morality of individuals in Western states. Devji explains that this endogenous pluralism accounts for why ostensibly secular Muslims take up the banner of extremism in their host countries. While this partially explains why fundamental Islam gains adherents, it does not answer the question of: Why violence as a means?

To affect change, Islamic militants believe that they must absolve the West of its previous transgressions by redeeming its morality through a mutual recognition of suffering – an awareness that can be triggered by spectacular violence. It is not, as some political leaders and commentators contend, the aim of these militants to subject the West to a modern Caliphate (the specifics of which, as mentioned earlier, have yet to be outlined). Rather, Islamic militants seek to stimulate the West into a non-religious conversion that accepts and establishes suprapolitical concerns as political. As such, Islamic militants are engaged in a friend/enemy dialectic with their Western foe, an interaction that Devji notes is sustained at the human level through detainee abuse in Western facilities. In this relationship, punishment is an act of love.

The West’s transgressions against humanity, though, are not directly related to economic or physical violence against Muslims and others, but the inability of the West (or, in theory, any other offender) to practice the moral standards it espouses in the global arena. The United States’ hypocrisy of preaching human rights while torturing detainees at the Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib detention centers is not lost on the Islamic world. Devji refines this idea further by arguing that liberalism is unsustainable globally because the values of liberalism are restricted to the institutions of the nation state:

Such limits [of liberalism] are evident in the circular definition that has marked liberalism from its founding days: only those will be tolerated who are themselves tolerant. Such a definition deprives tolerance of any moral content by making it completely dependent on the behavior of others. Tolerance therefore becomes a process of exclusion in which it is always the other person who is being judged…the definition is severely limited, because its circularity works only within the bounds of a nation state.3

To Devji, this shortcoming is untenable in the globalized world. To demonstrate, he points to Muslim uproar over the 2005 Mohammad caricatures published by a Dutch newspaper and Pope Benedict XVI’s controversial statements about The Prophet’s supposed endorsement of violence in 2006. The source of the Muslim community’s subsequent furor was not the blasphemy but the mass interpretation of these acts as a calculated insult coupled with the inability of an institution-less Islam to respond. What is needed, then, is for tolerance to be interpreted as a moral, not legal, concept. The establishment of suprapolitical norms would bypass the rigid legality that denies liberalism a global flexibility.

In an interesting juxtaposition interspersed throughout the text, Devji notes that the tactics and goals of Islamic militantism are perversions of Gandhian resistance. Both, for instance, support a politics of sacrifice which, through the act of martyrdom, transforms self-violence from a political expression with worldly ends into an existential statement. Through this self-negation, militants, like Gandhi, mean to symbolically actuate more morally acceptable inter-human relations by withdrawing from the objectionable realpolitik. The spectacle of this rejection allows for the emergence of the new suprapolitics. By employing Gandhi as a foil, Devji explicates the universal duality of the moral. Simultaneously, the moral motivates individuals to deliberate pacifism or violent barbarism. Without this deconstruction, Devji is unable to formulate his conclusion: that the establishment of a global politics premised on suprapolitical concerns is necessary to avoid the conflict endemic to the liberal system.

For all the intellectual weight of Devji’s argument, The Terrorist in Search of Humanity is deficient in some respects. For example, questions linger regarding the intentionality of Muslims extremists when making their pronouncements, on which a bulk of the book’s hypothesis rests. The author appears to waver on whether to take the militants’ words at face value, and the timidity is justified. Considering that direct access to these individuals is scant, his interpretations are impossible to substantiate. Additionally, Devji’s approach avoids analysis of extremist violence perpetrated in the pursuit of national aims, which has been explored by Robert Pape and others4. If news reports are accurate, how can the organized al-Qaeda inspired groups attempting to undermine the Iraqi government on sectarian grounds be labeled globally pluralist, much less concerned with the state of human morality? Certainly, al-Qaeda’s pluralism attracts individuals, but it is these individuals that create networks of resistance – the goals of which are dependent on the context. Devji’s dogged focus on pluralism neglects this aspect of militant Islam.

Despite its shortcomings, The Terrorist in Search of Humanity is a revolutionary piece of literature on the subject of terrorism. By questioning both the Other and the Self (an approach often ignored by positivist social scientists) Devji constructs a cohesive and ahistorical argument that transcends the polemicism indicting either Islam or Western liberalism as the source of militant violence. The true culprit is instead an essential human demand: the ever-present insistence for morality in human actions.

1See Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

2See Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror,” International Security 27 (2003), 5-29.

3Faisal Devji, The Terrorist in Search of Humanity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 176.

4See Robert Pape. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Political Science Review 97 (2003), 1-19.


In the post-World War II world, the practice of politics increasing emphasized effective administration rather than the participation of citizens in governance. Hannah Arendt responded to this trend in On Revolution, which attempts to explore the central role of politics in facilitating and perpetuating a good life and society. According to her book, these two aims can only be achieved if citizens create an atmosphere of public freedom in which they can engage in political activity and inquiry inspired by an originating revolutionary spirit. Harkening back to the republican ideals of Thomas Jefferson, she asserts, “No one could be called happy without his share of public happiness, that no one could be called free without his experience in public freedom, and that no one could be called happy or free without participating, and having a share, in public power.”[1] However, her vague terminology begs important questions. What is public freedom? What is public happiness? How does public happiness resulting from the practice of public freedom create a good life and society? In this examination, my aim is to address these questions in addition to explaining how the three outcomes of public freedom suggested in Arendt’s text form a good life and society. Then, I will conclude with an exploration on the implications of her arguments on the discipline of political science. But, before continuing, a quick summary of her work is in order.

Essentially, Arendt argues that revolutions – that is political upheavals aimed at securing liberty and, more importantly, freedom – foster a revolutionary spirit that energizes the masses into pursuing a pluralistic system of political deliberation and governance. Here, it is important to note the distinction Arendt makes between liberation and freedom as it is essential to her argument. She writes that liberation is merely the freedom from tyranny whereas freedom refers to participation in public affairs via unfettered speech, thought, association, and assembly. This freedom, imbued with the revolutionary spirit, is then applied in the public sphere; thus allowing for the creation of a society in which individuals are active in political life. As a result of the energized political atmosphere, citizens generate public happiness resulting in a good life in a good society. In other words, On Revolution argues that the establishment of a revolutionary inspired form of governance is the primary means through which a good life and society can be attained. One means of achieving this end is the institutionalization of town hall meetings where the revolutionary spirit can be sustained through deliberation. According to Arendt, a good life and society is not significantly influenced by the successful management of what she labels the “private welfare” of individuals. Rather, these two goals can be achieved only when citizens attain a certain level of public happiness via their activity in political life. Additionally, it is important to note that Arendt’s definition of a good life and society is cyclical; this idealized life is both the facilitator and product of public happiness. In order to make sense of the self-determining nature of these terms, an examination of the beneficial outcomes of public freedom must be undertaken.

From On Revolution, I have identified three ends that follow from the existence of political freedom in a society: public equality, public accountability, and a sphere in which private happiness can be attained. Consequently, these products of public freedom are the means though which a society can attain public happiness. The foundational elements of public happiness and public equality are, for Arendt, linked to the social capacity of all individuals to participate in public life. Arendt suggests that pubic equality can overcome the social divisions existing due to the differing socioeconomic conditions private welfare creates among individuals. Referencing the meaning of the term freedom in ancient Greece, she discusses the issue of no-rule, or isonomy, which describes a republic in which there is no distinction between the ruler and the ruled. This component of public happiness is vital to the formulation of her argument. It supposes that citizens are equal self-governing agents that are mutually responsible for the actions of government. Arendt labels this alliance of people for rule by the people the “mutual contract.”[2] Second, the capacity of the public to hold the government accountable for its decisions is crucial to the production of public happiness. While it is commonly assumed that public accountability refers to “representatives,” the Arendtian view of “public” – strongly influenced by the idea of isonomy – is more expansive. Arendt contends: “Corruption of the people themselves – as distinguished from the corruption of their representatives or a ruling class – is possible only under a government that has granted them a share of the public power.”[3] Or, to put it differently, an isonomic society, which promotes the active use of public freedoms, must ensure that the people themselves do not become corrupted by the power inherent in practice of public freedom. The absence of public accountability in the Arendtian sense undermines the evaluative democratic function that citizens perform when participating in the various activities of public life, including political deliberation and the electoral process. Public apathy among citizens produces a space in which certain individuals can utilize the public interest to pursue private means. The remedy to this looming specter, she argues, is the practice of public freedoms. Hence, a dearth of public accountability is indicative of a society that lacks the ability to utilize its public freedom and, as a result, is unable to fulfill the fundamental precepts of public happiness.

While Arendt expresses her suspicion of the threats posed by private interests to the sanctity of the public realm, she concedes that after the people have gained liberty and freedom private interests play an important role in preserving the revolutionary spirit. Hence, the final benefit of public freedom is its ability of citizens to pursue private happiness unimpeded. Even though she writes that “under no conditions can [economic factors] either lead into freedom or constitute a proof of its existence,” Arendt juxtaposes this statement with a contradictory argument.[4] To explain this occurrence, she believes private happiness should never be considered above public happiness, as public happiness is the foundation upon which all other goods are pursued. But, as she puts it, “Wealth and economic well-being are the fruits of freedom” – albeit ones that are subordinate to the real benefits of public freedom.[5] As noted previously, private interests can corrupt the isonomic order. This disruption of no-rule presents an opportunity for freedom to be lost or, in the worst case scenario, the return of tyranny. Yet, a certain level of private contentment must be produced by public freedom to ensure that the revolutionary spirit is maintained. As noted by Arendt, a lack of private happiness invariably introduces the “social question” which asks how to provide for the private welfare of citizens into public discourse. In handling this concern, the importance of public freedom in constructing a good society is marginalized due to the need of administrative functions to produce acceptable private welfare. A further examination of the tensions existing between the advantages and disadvantages posed by private happiness to the achievement of public happiness will be addressed later.

Despite explicating the intricacies of Arendt’s argument, On Revolution fails to submit claims that are empirically assessable or defensible in light of critical observation. Even when attempting to explore her line of reasoning regarding the influence of the three products of public freedom on public happiness, the explanations end with a process of cyclical self-justification. These shortcomings ultimately minimize the applicability of her to work to the discipline of political science.

To begin, Arendt’s use of hazily-defined terms and concepts necessitates some standardization of understanding and, thus, a framework of understanding needs to be formulated. To illustrate, if it were quantifiably possible to rate public happiness on a scale of one to ten, with ten being ultimate public happiness, would a rating of seven or above equate to the presence of a good life and society? Even more, there is the problem as to how the appropriate level of public happiness is determined. In other words, what method would be utilized to measure the abstract level of public happiness or its constituent parts? Arendt’s inferences, while logically valid and beneficial to the study of political science, rely solely on a philosophical understanding of the issues surrounding public freedom, which, unfortunately for interested political scientists, renders empirical testing almost impossible. To borrow Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba’s observations in Designing Social Inquiry, “[Social scientists] should choose observable, rather than unobservable, concepts wherever possible. Abstract, unobserved concepts such as utility, culture, intentions, motivations, identification, intelligence, or the national interest are often used in social science theories. They can play a useful role in theory formulation; but they can be a hindrance to empirical evaluation of theories and hypotheses unless they can be defined in a way such that they, or at least their implications, can be observed and measured.”[6] Instead of providing political science with inferences that are testable, On Revolution forces individuals into a logic-based determination of the practicability of attaining public happiness. Of course, this can only be achieved by examining public freedom via a subjective examination of its ill-defined parts.

Not only are Arendt’s positions almost impossible to test quantitatively or qualitatively, her view of human nature is arguably idealistic. A major criticism of On Revolution addresses her assumption that a great majority of individual citizens will embrace the foundational spirit of public freedom and actively participate in the deliberative processes that are central to her position on public happiness and a good life. This belief is difficult to justify on two accounts. First, its contention that all citizens share the same interests and values is unsubstantiated. Often, individuals such as artists and the devoutly pious derive immense satisfaction when pursuing a life that includes little participation in the public sphere. While some political scientists have attempted to methodologically determine the validity of the claim that value plurality is subservient in the presence of public freedoms, Arendt’s text poorly supports this point. Second, implicit in this reasoning is the belief that the invisible hand of the revolutionary spirit will guide individuals away from pursuing private welfare in order to secure public happiness. Again, Arendt produces little evidence to justify these claims. Rather, in both of these cases she returns to a cyclical style of argumentation, asserting that the participatory elements of public freedom generate a good life and vice versa. Stemming from this vein of analysis, she fails to fully address the reasons why individuals should spurn private interests in deference to public freedom. In fact, an argument can be made supporting the belief that a certain level of private welfare and participation in public freedoms are connected. If, for example, an individual finds it difficult to secure their basic means of existence it is naïve to assume that their priority would be political participation. Conversely, individual’s whose private welfare has achieved a certain level of satisfactoriness and consistency can entertain a plurality of concerns, including public activity. Ultimately, the Arendtian counterpoint that public freedom will provide a sphere in which private welfare concerns can be addressed is too utopian. Individuals will always be in a position in where they must find a suitable equilibrium between activity in the public and private spheres.

In light of the individual’s natural struggle between the pursuit private and public happiness, Arendt’s insistence that the existence of public spheres, such as town halls or soviets, where the people can continue to cultivate the revolutionary spirit in an environment promoting and protecting isonomy in order to achieved public happiness is undermined. Despite recognizing that all individuals are publicly equal, the differences in public welfare among individuals produce inequalities regarding the ability of some citizens to gain access to these public spheres. Without the active participation of all elements of society in the public sphere, public accountability through a deliberative processes imbued by the revolutionary spirit is absent. Consequently, this provides privately privileged individuals with an opportunity to circumvent the isonomic order by pursuing private interests within the public sphere.

As a work of political philosophy, On Revolution attempts to promote the idea that the study of politics is a tool through which public freedom can be achieved because the idea concerns the well being of the community. However, it fails as a work that can be used within the constructs of social science for two grounds. First, Arendt’s use of cyclical argumentation to substantiate concepts that lack any viable method of examination via the standards of the social sciences renders any of application of her ideas impossible. Second, further examination of Arendt’s work becomes difficult due to her idealist interpretation of 18th Century revolutionary history to actual patterns of individual decision-making. For these reasons, it becomes difficult for political scientists to verify her theory through the observation of replicable data. Instead, in many cases it is more likely that any empirical attempt to verify her claims would undermine Arendt’s thesis. This is not to insinuate that On Revolution is without any value to the study of politics. While its ambitious aim of directing the discipline of political science towards molding a more perfect society through the recognition of public participation as life’s central good does not succeed, the book is still a philosophical text that students of politics can explore to build future theories. In sum, On Revolution is simply a text that stimulates political inquiry within the profession.

[1] Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 225.

[2] Arendt, 170.

[3] Arendt, 252.

[4] Arendt, 217.

[5] Arendt, 217.

[6] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 109.

John Stuart Mill’s “Utilitarianism” and Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Philosophy of Right explicate both thinkers’ belief that the pursuit of private happiness is central to human decision-making processes. Mill advocates the Greatest Happiness Principle, which states that individuals are naturally inclined to weigh utility to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Hegel fundamentally agrees with Mill’s assertion but, in accordance with his logic, the individual and his/her interests do not exist in a vacuum. Other institutions, such as the family and civil society, temper the subjective drive to fulfill pleasure. Yet, at the same time, these institutions formulate and attempt to achieve their own particular interest in the same manner as individuals. For example, the familial unit creates its own subjective interest as an entity because the individuals composing the family relegate their own pursuit of happiness in recognitive deference to the family’s subjective interests. In other words, the family is individuated within a society of families. Despite sharing the same foundational belief, Mill and Hegel strongly disagree regarding the value of humans’ pursuit of happiness in the political realm. Understanding this difference in the political writings of Hegel and Mill hinges on an analysis of their conceptions of truth or, as labeled by Hegel, the actual. It is the issue of truth to which I will now turn.

For Mill, truth is nothing more than the result of individuals’ respectful acknowledgement and sharing of their subjective conceptions of happiness. Through this process, people determine what is right not only for themselves but also their nation. Mill’s writings on freedom of the press relative to the maintenance of free and happy individuals embody his conception of truth. He argues that people in a society are best equipped to participate in the decisions of their country if multiple news sources subjectively provide information on issues concerning the national welfare. The multiplicity of views results in rational public deliberation and, in the end, the most rational argument is adopted. Here, by rational argument, I mean that which is perceived by the individuals to provide the most utility. Hegel’s perception of truth is in stark contrast. He asserts that truth is not a transient concept determined by the subjective will of a collective of individuals. Truth exists as the universal will – which is determined by the will of God – and is manifested concretely in the state. The subjective only exists in the Hegelian dialectic to be overcome in pursuit of the universal will. While subjectivity may subsist at stages, it is progressively synthesized with the actual until the rational ultimate end is reached. Hegel writes: “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.”[1]

It is important to note that Hegel formulated his conception of truth in the tumultuous aftermath of the French Revolution, which he attributed to subjectivity’s triumph over the universal will. He was also strongly influence by the German unification movement, which he adamantly supported. Keeping the historical context in mind, the Hegelian critique of Mill’s Utilitarianism is illuminated. Within the political realm, subjective rationality does not, for Hegel, guarantee a stable order in which individuals can pursue happiness. Through persuasion, for example, the particular interests of individuals can dominate the public discourse and divert the common will from its objective ends, which is the happiness of man as freedom. Or, the clash of particular interests, under certain circumstances, can paralyze the rule of law. Hegel would also argue that the universal will is central to the continuation of the state. The subjective will’s degradation of the actual may produce the disintegration of the state as a national entity.

The declining nation has lost the interest of the absolute; it may indeed absorb the higher principle positively and begin building its life on it, but the principle is only like an adopted child, not like a relative to whom its ties are immanently vital and vigorous. Perhaps it loses its autonomy, or it may still exist, or drag out its existence, as a particular state or a group of states and involve itself without rhyme or reason in manifold enterprises at home and battles abroad.[2]

Since the state is both the embodiment and transcendence of the each individual’s will, happiness is achieved when individuals serve the state. Thus, the stability of the state and the freedom of its subjects are maintained. In other words, truth begets happiness when the individual realizes and submits to the universal will. Applying Hegel’s writings to their historical context, his construction of the political aimed to simultaneously attempt to guard against terrors like those perpetrated during the French Revolution while also providing a framework with which a single German state could be constructed and maintained.

Mill would contend that Hegel’s rigid logic mistakenly relies on an unwavering belief in a determinable and particular actual. Throughout Mill’s writings, religion is considered an irrational force impeding the progress of man and, therefore, the core concept of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is flawed. Early in the text of “Utilitarianism” Mill directly counter’s those who criticize his conclusions as dismissive of God’s will from their own turf. In a broadside against utilitarianism’s religiously-inclined detractors, Mill argues that God desires the happiness of individuals and that His will is not founded in a concrete set of laws. Humans are agents capable of constructing a common truth or will. He writes: “If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognize the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that the utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believe that whatever God has though fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfill the requirements of utility in a supreme degree.”[3] Essentially, the will of God accommodates and, in fact, promotes the subjective pursuit of truth defined as greatest happiness because God’s will as law is unknowable. There is, however, a deeper assumption in Mill’s claim. If God’s will is indeterminable, individuals must discern the nature of His character. In this line of reasoning, the Creator is, for both Mill and Hegel, compassionate because creation is irrational if His intention is to deprive or destroy the creation. The act of creation is necessarily constructive and well-intentioned. Assuming the existence of a Creator, I find the logic of this argument compelling because it implies that individuals are agents. To start by accepting the assertion of a benevolent God and then, like Hegel, build a claim that mortals can determine the nature of a particular universal law willed by God, however, is tenuous. While Hegel champions the progression of reason, his foundational belief in an ascertainable universal will is without persuasive logical grounding.

Mill and Hegel both articulate theories of progress and believe that the individuals pursue their own interests defined as happiness. Their beliefs diverge, however, when they attempt to articulate the parameters of a just socio-political order. Mill contends that harmony and freedom are attained through the free and open pursuit of multiple subjectivities. Ubiquitous realization of the predominance of private welfare for individuals creates a rational public discourse which, in turn, produces governance interested in securing individual freedom. Hegel, in contrast, believes that the private welfare, while logical at the level of the self and family, must ultimately be restrained to maintain individual freedom. Instead, particular interests of individuals must be synthesized into the universal will concretely manifested in the state. At the core of the thinkers’ differences are their conceptions of truth. Mill’s truth is rooted in the subjective whereas for Hegel it is exists in a singular, objective form. Assuming the existence of God, the logic supporting the Creator’s benevolence convincingly substantiates Mill’s argument. Hegel’s presupposition that the universal will is particular and knowable, though compatible with the logic of his argument, is an otherworldly claim that undercuts his theory of law.

[1] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. and ed. T.M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 10.

[2] Ibid, 317.

[3] John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. Geraint Williams (London: Everyman Press, 1993), 22.

The Obama (Anti)Revolution

November 7, 2008

Traffic ground to a halt in the East Village Tuesday night as the masses flooded the streets to celebrate Senator Barack Obama’s victory. The masses chanted “yes we can” and “change we can believe in” to the beat of clanking pots while some revelers clambered up traffic signals draped in American flags to wave Obama signs and capture the view. Even the typically annoyed cabbies ignored the gridlock, honking their horns in jubilation. The outpour of joy at the scene was, in a way, reminiscent of reunification of Berlin

Perceivable in the mass celebration was the shared belief in a real reclamation of power by and for the people from the ostensible tyranny imposed during the presidency of the George W. Bush. The masses interpretation of Obama’s victory as a real transformative political event, however, myopically embraces the subjective without comprehending the actual. Obama’s victory is, in reality, a non-event with anti-revolutionary implications.

In order for an event to be political, according to French philosopher Alain Badiou, it must effect change of the political system itself rather than the state of the situation within the political system. In other words, a political event disrupts the actuality of a political formation. The disruption is revolutionary. But why must the political system undergo transformation? The answer for Badiou lies in the indeterminacy of states’ power in relation to the determinacy of power possessed by the demos. Through revolutionary political function, the masses can determine the excess of power wielded by the state. The discussion of policy without realizing this excess of power is, then, a counter-progressive function. It is through recognition that the masses can move to separate their realm of limited power from the infinite power of the state and create a space of for liberty.

See Badiou’s formulations:

σ < ε                π(ε)<—>ε

Where σ = situation (the people)
Where ε = state
Where π = political function

Applying Badiou’s systemic-transformative definition of a political event to Obama’s election reveals its actuality as a non-event. The ubiquitous perception of this non-event as real, as demonstrated on the evening of November 4th, diminishes the peoples’ capacity to facilitate transformative political functions. I argue – and I believe that Badiou would agree – that revolutionary political functions need not be a violent disruption. Rather they can be a socio-psychological realization resulting in actual mobilization against the indeterminacy of the state’s power. If a political non-event is perceived as an event, however, this transformative possibility is extinguished.

For the sake of clarity (considering the strength and effects of the particularism instilled through party identity), the hypothetical election of Senator John McCain would not qualify as a political event since his election would still be reconfirmation of the existing indeterminate power of the political system.

In writing this, I am not trying to take away from Obama’s accomplishment. His battle for the presidency was well fought and the victory may even prove to be a real sociological event. However, Obama’s supporters have overestimated their role as transformative agents and, through this misidentification, are jeopardizing their potential to create space for the formation of political function and, consequently, the future production of real political events.